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Campaigning on expertise: how the
OECD framed EU welfare and labour
market policies – and why success
could trigger failure
Jo¨rg Michael Dostal
ABSTRACT This article explains how the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) assumed a leadership role in creating and
disseminating liberal welfare reform and labour market policy proposals between
1994 and 2001. The article first sketches the increased Europeanization of welfare
and labour market policies throughout the 1990s. The second part examines how
international organizations such as the OECD influence agenda-setting at different
levels of policy-making by providing a controlled environment for the creation,
development and dissemination of political discourse. The OECD’s influence on
policy-making can be explained through an analysis of the specific features of its
‘organizational discourse’, dominated by liberal economists, and characterized by
the exclusion of interest groups. The third part takes the OECD Jobs Study
(1994)as an exemplary case of its organizational discourse and demonstrates how
the OECD utilized this study to bridge the gap between abstract liberal economic
beliefs and concrete agenda-setting efforts. It underlines the high degree of influence
of the Jobs Study on the EU’s subsequent European Employment Strategy (EES).
The conclusion poses the question: to what extent could the OECD’s ‘campaigning
on expertise’ potentially weaken its long-term institutional interests if the EU
chooses to ‘take over’ OECD discourses wholesale – thereby leaving less organiza-
tional space for the OECD in the future?
KEY WORDS Agenda-setting; European Employment Strategy; European
Union; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development; organizational
discourse; welfare reform.
1. INTRODUCTION
This article outlines how the OECD’s Directorate for Education, Employment,
Labour and Social Affairs (DEELSA) influenced EU welfare and labour
market reform agendas between 1994 and 2001.1 Following an upturn in
unemployment levels at the beginning of the 1990s, OECD Labour Ministers
and Economic and Finance Ministers asked the OECD in 1992 to study the
underlying reasons for high unemployment levels in member countries. In
1994, the OECD reported back and presented its Jobs Study (OECD 1994a,
1994b, 1994c). The study argued that labour market regulations and welfare
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state provisions should be scaled down in order to make labour markets more
flexible and reduce structural unemployment. At the same time, the European
Union’s (EU’s) White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, and Employment
(CEC 1993) was drawn up and put forward similar demands. Taken together,
the two studies provided each other with additional legitimacy and set the
agenda for welfare and labour market reforms in the 1990s and in the early
years of the twenty-first century.
The reason for selecting the Jobs Study rather than the White Paper as the
point of departure is that many of its political claims continue to inform
contemporary welfare and labour market reform agendas such as the EU’s
European Employment Strategy (EES). The White Paper, by contrast, rather
represented a flotation of potential policy options, many of which – such as
the seemingly ‘Euro-Keynesian’ demand for investment in ‘Trans-European
networks’ – were never properly pursued. This article analyses how DEELSA
focused on the Jobs Study as one of its main activities to ‘campaign on
expertise’ between 1994 and 2001 in the labour market field before turning
towards newly emerging issues of active ageing policies (OECD 2001a: 34),
arguably because the EU had by then accepted and ‘taken over’ many of the
political claims of the Jobs Study in its EES.
In what follows the article first outlines the broader debate about welfare
and labour market reform in the 1990s (section 2) and moves on to sketch
various theories of political agenda-setting (section 3). In the fourth and fifth
sections the perspective of ‘organizational discourse’ is put forward in order to
explain how institutions such as the OECD create and disseminate ideas. The
sixth section takes the Jobs Study as an example to illustrate organizational
discourse, and the seventh section demonstrates how the OECD influenced
EU welfare and labour market agendas throughout the 1990s. The concluding
section poses the question concerning the extent to which ‘campaigning on
expertise’ has been based on a division of labour between the OECD and the
EU, and whether this division of labour in the management of policy-relevant
knowledge will be sustainable in the future.
2. WELFARE AND LABOUR MARKET POLICY DEBATES IN THE
1990S
In the 1990s, policies of unemployment compensation and of social protection
in EU member states were transformed on a number of levels. First, preparation
for economic and monetary union (EMU) separated macroeconomic policy-
making from the agenda of employment policy. High levels of unemployment
were no longer interpreted as being triggered by low growth rates owing to
insufficient demand. Subsequently, Keynesian macroeconomic stimulation and
explicitly redistributive policies were dropped from the agenda (Fine 1998:
36–51). Instead, liberal labour market theorists explained unemployment as a
structural issue arising from over-regulation of the wage labour relationship
and over-generous wage replacement payments; in particular, the long-term
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unemployed were seen as far too removed from the labour market to exercise
effective restraint on ‘wage drift’ of the employed (cf. Layard 1999). Therefore,
the focus on ‘sound’ macroeconomic policies had to be combined with micro-
level intervention on the supply-side of the labour market, and employment
policy turned subsequently towards an eclectic range of policy instruments
held to ‘activate’ the unemployed (Armingeon 2002; Clift 2002: 497; Shaw
2003).
Second, the functional separation between wage replacement payments, on
the one hand, and other social protection policies aimed at groups without
recent labour market contact, on the other, was eroded in political discourses
and, to a varying degree, in practical policy-making (Clasen 2000; Kvist 2000).
In most EU member states, unemployment and other forms of ‘worklessness’
became framed as belonging to the same policy-making problem and policies
of ‘activation’, ‘welfare reform’, ‘welfare-to-work’ or even ‘workfare’ were placed
on the agenda in order to address the issue.2 What these policies share is
their concern to connect reforms of unemployment compensation and social
assistance with broader labour market policy objectives in order to increase
labour supply as well as numerical employment levels.
Third, the introduction of a new employment chapter in the Amsterdam
Treaty in 1997 opened the agenda for employment policy-making at the
Community level. The new Treaty articles were based on earlier EU policy
deliberations such as the 1993 White Paper and the member states’ commit-
ment in the ‘Essen process’ (1994) to co-operate in key areas regarding
employment. Since 1998, the EES (or ‘Luxembourg process’) has been based
on the ‘open method of co-ordination’ and the annual ‘benchmarking’ of
member states’ employment policies through ‘National Action Plans’. The
Council’s current policy states that this new mode of governance should result
in the development of shared policy beliefs over time (Council 2000). The
EES resulted in the creation of new institutions at the EU level such as the
Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee, and new
expert networks and internet-based data compilations were set up in order to
monitor national policies (Mosher and Trubek 2003).3 Thus, new supranational
discourses aimed at and addressing member states’ systems of unemployment
compensation and social protection became rapidly institutionalized (Goetschy
2003).
Such a rising degree of EU involvement in member states’ welfare and
labour market policies depends crucially on the development of a shared set
of policy-relevant expertise at the community level. In principle, such shared
expertise could have been developed through deliberation between EU member
states about their respective national policies. Alternatively, however, expertise
could also be procured from another organization in the same field in order to
provide a joint point of departure for their own efforts at a later time. In the
mid- to late 1990s, the OECD happened to be uniquely placed to provide
such a set of well-developed welfare and labour market policies to EU policy-
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makers in areas in which the EU had not previously held well-developed track
records.
3. THE POLITICS OF AGENDA-SETTING
It is certainly difficult to explain shifts in policy-making exclusively by the
agenda-setting efforts of single institutions. In practical terms, e´lite discourses
and policy deliberations cannot be separated from each other along formal
organizational lines or levels of policy-making. This is because of the high
degree of interaction and interdependency between national bureaucracies and
their supranational and international counterparts. Both supranational and
international organizations (including intergovernmental organizations such as
the OECD) are frequently engaged in long-term agenda-setting efforts and
advance planning exercises. In fact, national bureaucracies, working under the
constant pressure of established clients and in areas with clearly observable
distributive outcomes, might prefer to transfer their more troublesome business
to them. However, international organizations pursue simultaneously their
own institutional interests; they need to mark out a place for their own agency
in order to secure a leadership position in certain policy fields relevant to the
organization’s sustainability. This process represents an ongoing challenge and
demands constant adaptation. For example, recent debates highlighted the
danger of duplication of efforts and unwanted competition between inter-
national bodies and stressed their position as ‘convener’ and as a focal point
of international knowledge management (Witte et al. 2001).
In fact, it is this highly political role of international knowledge management
and its function for agenda-setting which is not yet sufficiently analysed. The
theoretical perspective of organizational discourse (see section 4 below) can
help to explain more convincingly agenda-setting mechanisms in newly emerg-
ing fields such as EU employment and social protection policy. Moreover, this
perspective improves the explanatory power of existing accounts of the policy
process and bridges the gap in the literature between various institutionalist
accounts and parallel debates on agenda-setting.
To begin with, institutionalist authors place strong emphasis on the self-
interest of organizations to grow over time and ‘to develop more formalized
rule systems covering more and more of the possible situations they are likely
to encounter’ (Downs 1967: 18). However, rather than merely being interested
in growth for growth’s sake, organizations are also engaged in ‘bureau-shaping’
strategies in order to secure the control of policy areas, which fit in well with
their ‘ideal bureau form’ (Dunleavy 1991: 202–5). The strategic interaction
between organizations is therefore shaped by attempts to secure discursive
control over certain areas of expertise, and this means in practical terms
competing against discourses of other organizations in the same field. According
to Elkin, ‘the purposes institutions create are expressed in their practices’ (Elkin,
quoted in Wildavsky 1987: 17); and Wildavsky observed that institutional
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preferences exist inside of organizations only to the extent to which they are
shared through social validation procedures (Wildavsky 1987: 9).
Such interaction between institutions and discursive power is indeed one
frequently noted feature of the EU policy-making process, in which all agenda-
setting efforts must be sustained for extended periods of time in order to
attract supporters and legitimacy for a cause (Zito 2001: 587). It should
be noted that such long-term strategies provide advantages for established
organizations as opposed to more ad hoc coalition-building efforts. In order to
study the agenda-setting process at both the European and national level, the
focus should therefore be placed on the discursive interaction patterns between
the most important organizations in a given field of policy-making.
In the case of European welfare and labour market policy, the set of
important organizations for the analysis of agenda-setting patterns includes the
OECD, the relevant EU Committees and national advisory bodies and research
institutions as well as the most prominent individual researchers. The focus
should be placed on discursive interaction patterns between different organiza-
tions over the control of shared ‘policy frames’ (Scho¨n and Rein 1994).4 The
next section describes this process as the competition between different
organizational discourses.
4. THE ORGANIZATIONAL DISCOURSE PERSPECTIVE
According to Grant, organizational discourse describes the language and
symbolic media used by organizations and the people who manage and work
in them (2001: 8). More specifically, organizational discourse can be perceived
as ‘mode of thinking’ (van Dijk, quoted in Grant et al. 2001: 7), and Fairclough
argues that the power to control discourse is ‘the power to sustain particular
discursive practices with particular ideological investments in dominance over
other alternative (including oppositional) practices’ (Fairclough 1995: 2). The
multidisciplinary nature of organizational discourse studies includes a broad
range of analytical devices such as modes of linguistic inquiry as well as the
study of formal organizations (broadly conceived) inside of which discourse is
created and disseminated, i.e. it aims to bridge the gap between the analysis
of discourse and the underlying material structure of ideas.
The analysis of public policy from an organizational discourse perspective
requires observers to search for ‘first mover’ situations in order to trace back
the histories of currently hegemonic policies: we may ask, in which particular
institutional settings were new policy-relevant ideas and cognitive frameworks
first developed; and how did they subsequently acquire their hegemonic status
inside of the relevant policy-making networks? Inquiries into organizational
discourse should therefore focus on an organization’s internal value system,
which is in turn shaped by underlying cognitive frameworks of a vague
and long-standing nature. Organizational discourse – observed from this
perspective – is neither scientific discourse nor should it be directly compared
with epistemic communities. In fact, organizational discourse is not necessarily
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very discursive. Rather, it is based on the power of discursive closure.
Organizations create their own knowledge based on strategically selected
issues and aim to disseminate resulting expertise in communication with an
organization’s policy-making environment.
In order to develop discursive power, agents of successful organizations will
tend to represent their organization’s point of view repeatedly and in a broad
variety of contexts while convincing other institutions to adapt to them
incrementally. As a general rule, therefore, organizational discourse – i.e. claims
encapsulating long-term political projects as defined by the organization in
question – is not changed every other year, and agents will use the power of
discursive repetition in order to influence policy-making in a lasting manner.
From this perspective, long-term policy change can be analysed as the mutual
adaptation of organizational discourse. At certain times, organizations expand
in order to cover new fields of policy-making. At other times, they will defend
their authority of expertise against challenges from competitors.
From the analyst’s viewpoint, the offensive or defensive position of an
organization’s institutional discourse in agenda-setting efforts and subsequent
policy-making can only be observed over longer periods of time. Such analysis
must also take into account that organizational boundaries are not fixed. In
some cases, institutional co-operation in networks is well established and the
agenda-setting function of an organization – its specific ‘niche’ – is fully
acknowledged as part of a long-standing division of labour in policy-making.
Yet, any organization’s comparative advantage in broader policy networks
depends at the same time on the ability to sustain its authoritative voice in
specific areas of expertise.
In most cases, organizations with knowledge-managing functions can be
separated to a certain degree from policy-making bodies such as national
ministries. The management of knowledge demands a higher degree of
specialization and the recruitment and training of expert personnel over longer
time-frames. Because of their long-term planning capability, supranational
organizations can often secure a degree of informational advantage in compari-
son to other parts of a policy network. In national ministries, on the other
hand, such long-term policy entrepreneurship is more difficult to sustain owing
to the pressure and demands put forward by interest groups and clients. Thus,
national ministries frequently depend for their informed response to newly
emerging problems on the advice of more specialized international bodies.5
The next section demonstrates the analytical usefulness of the organizational
discourse perspective by using the OECD’s DEELSA as a case study. It is
argued here that DEELSA (and other OECD Directorates) frequently acted
as ‘first movers’ and prepared the ground for subsequent EU policy delibera-
tions. This process provides an example of the mutual adaptation of organiza-
tional discourse over time. The argument proceeds by first outlining some
peculiarities of the OECD and second by analysing the development of its
organizational discourse with regard to the case of labour market policies and
welfare reform.
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5. THE ORGANIZATIONAL DISCOURSE OF THE OECD
The OECD has features of an international civil service, a think-tank and a
shared state apparatus, and is based on the broad representation of advanced
industrialized countries from all three regional trade blocs. Its internal structure
is intergovernmental, with a ministerial council as the most important formal
decision-making organ and permanent national representatives working on
policy proposals alongside the organization’s professional staff, who number
2,000. The organization is structured along directorial lines with 700 research
personnel, most of them economists as well as lawyers, scientists and regulatory
experts. This official structure of Directorates and Directorate-guided Commit-
tees and Working Parties exists alongside informal networks of so-called ad hoc
groups, many of them of a long-standing nature with their own bureau and
elected chair.6 However, the OECD holds no budgetary powers or power of
sanctions in contrast to the EU. Its authority depends therefore solely on the
quality of its advice and expertise as perceived by its member states.
The OECD’s control of specialist regulatory knowledge frequently helps the
organization to gain comparative advantage in newly emerging fields of policy-
making, such as the regulation of private health care and private pensions and
the restructuring and privatization of state assets. Its organizational culture
attracts over-representation of Anglo-American personnel with regard to both
nationality and professional qualifications earned.7 The OECD’s Directorates
and their research capacity provide for the international element of the
organization, while the Committees and ad hoc groups provide for the
intergovernmental co-ordination of national expertise through delegates from
national ministries. The Committees meet at regular intervals on the OECD
ministerial level, and agreed policy documents often have an observable long-
term impact on national policy-making.
OECD: from confrontation exercise to benchmarking
The OECD was founded in 1961 to help member states to compare and co-
ordinate national economic policies. This process was termed the ‘confrontation
exercise’ in the organization’s early literature (OECD 1969: 8; Archer 1994:
ch. 3) and can be understood as an intellectual predecessor to the current
benchmarking fashion in EU policy-making. In both cases, working procedures
are held to facilitate mutual adaptation of policy-makers’ assumptions and a
certain degree of subsequent policy convergence. The OECD’s routinized
policy style and the emphasis on the regular provision of a broad range of
country surveys, economic sector studies and policy statements all add to the
organization’s authority – based in turn on assumptions of impartial and
disinterested advisory work. The organization aims to depoliticize issues of
economic and social policy-making into questions of ‘pure’ expertise to
be dealt with from the position of ‘best practice’ and without too much
institutionalized interference from interest groups. This includes the isolation
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
eo
ul 
Na
tio
na
l U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
0:5
1 3
0 N
ov
em
be
r 2
01
5 
J.M. Dostal: Campaigning on expertise 447
of early stages of OECD policy deliberation in order to guarantee that no veto
powers are exercised.
The OECD’s organizational beliefs since the mid-1970s have been informed
by neo-liberal rather than Keynesian economics – which makes the organization
one of the first advocates of supply-side labour market reform (cf. Keohane
1978). The organization argues that market signals and rational actor assump-
tions provide for convincing policy analysis in all fields and that state
agency should be checked by market forces whenever possible. Thus, ‘specific
knowledge’ with regard to particular political problems and ‘general knowledge’
with regard to the overarching framework of market efficiency assumptions
interact with each other – the latter being always in a dominant position –
and influence subsequent OECD policy advice.8 Consequently, the OECD
analyses its member states’ institutional settings and capabilities primarily in
order to develop detailed reform agendas for more market-based incentive
regimes. For example, the OECD was the only institution that undertook
long-term comparative research on its member states’ public employment
services and social assistance provisions throughout the 1990s and published
detailed material about working procedures and organizational behaviour.9 The
debate about the future function of the public employment service and its
modernization was thereby moved from the national to the international
level and the OECD proved subsequently keen to link its evaluative work
(constructing a new body of knowledge on employment services) with the
emerging ‘welfare-to-work’ agenda.
It is important to note that the OECD’s organizational discourse emerges
in a broad variety of venues and according to rather different sets of rules
depending on the level of policy-making. First, OECD working groups develop
new statistical and technical indicators in order to facilitate subsequent
benchmarking exercises. Second, the benchmarking of new fields of policy-
making enables the OECD to extend its organizational discourse and helps to
provide long-term reference frames for national policy-makers. Finally, at the
level of Committees and Ministerial Council meetings, such frames of reference
are made public and gain an explicitly political character: technical knowledge
has been translated into the language of political demands.
These complementary processes are nevertheless aimed at rather different
audiences. At the level of working groups, methodological debates about the
development of criteria for OECD benchmarking exercises facilitate the
emergence of epistemic communities. However, at the politically more visible
Committee level and in its publications intended for general distribution, the
OECD chooses to adopt a popular and non-confrontational style. As one
observer has pointed out, OECD reports ‘allow a multiplicity of interpretations,
so that almost everybody can find an interpretation with which he or she
would agree’ (Malinvaud in OECD 2000b: 53). The authority of the OECD’s
‘voice’ is therefore based on the choice of certain analytically suitable variables
for benchmarking exercises, while others (not adaptable to purely quantitative
inquiry) are excluded. Subsequent results of analytical work are then presented
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in a highly stylized manner as established facts that should be accepted by
policy-makers as the best available knowledge. This process of pursuing
discourses over time in order to make them into the common currency of
policy-making is discussed in the next section which examines the case of the
OECD Jobs Study.
6. ORGANIZATIONAL DISCOURSE: THE CASE OF THE OECD
JOBS STUDY
The OECD Jobs Study provides a useful example to explain the development
of organizational discourse over time. The function of the Jobs Study has been
to provide a long-term platform for the OECD’s work with regard to welfare
and labour market policies. Most OECD documents between 1994 and 2001
take the study’s assumptions as a reference point and repeat its findings and
conclusions. The study is organized around a list of ten demands in favour of
liberal welfare and labour market reform and is put forward in a short pamphlet
(1994a). Two volumes of supporting ‘evidence and explanations’ provide the
authority of the discipline of academic economics without being much referred
to in the more influential pamphlet (OECD 1994b, 1994c). Some of the
demands are fairly general in scope and include the commitment to macro-
economic stability, the fostering of an entrepreneurial climate, diffusion of
technology, and improvement in education and training.10
However, most of the demands (six out of ten) relate directly to labour
market policies. The focus is on flexible working times, a shift of wage
bargaining away from the sectoral to the local or plant level, and on limiting
the scope and duration of unemployment insurance and other benefits. Overall,
the study’s discourse is ‘open-ended’ in the sense that there is no clearly defined
starting point and final destination for its flexible labour market approach.
The OECD’s agency in this knowledge-managing process works in two
directions: first, particular national welfare and labour market policies are
selected by the organization for further study provided they fit into the
OECD’s own framework of liberal beliefs; second, such policies are studied
primarily in order to identify certain practices – i.e. ‘policy variables’ such as
institutions and incentive structures – that could be transferred from one
OECD country to others. Thus, the OECD conducts policy selection,
subsequent development and, if successful, policy transfers amongst its
membership.
In practical terms, the OECD’s agenda-setting effort requires the organiza-
tion to wait for the emergence of national ‘policy windows’ (Kingdon 1984)
to put forward its policy proposals to governments. However, the OECD can
increase its chance of doing so successfully if a well-developed supply-side of
‘policies in the waiting’ already exists and is maintained over time (Marcussen
2001). If certain policy proposals start to gain influence in debates with
governments, the OECD pursues them further in order to increase their
impact. If other ideas fail to gain credibility, they are quietly dropped after a
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while. In the case of the Jobs Study, for example, the OECD organized its
work as a permanent campaign effort; much of the work of ‘translating’ the
Jobs Study into detailed policy recommendations was undertaken by DEELSA
and other Directorates. The organization’s researchers pursued a number
of interrelated and overlapping reform proposals concerning labour market
regulations, unemployment compensation and the tax-benefit system.
The unifying feature of these themes is the claim that financial disincentives
in existing systems of unemployment compensation and other benefits would
encourage the unemployed to be too selective in their job search efforts. The
main demand of DEELSA’s work throughout the 1990s was therefore that
national governments should cut the duration and size of unemployment
compensation in combination with a commitment to pursue active labour
market policies (ALMPs) only in those cases in which they are clearly linked
with market-driven employment outcomes. Other types of ALMPs such as
state-sponsored protected labour markets for the difficult to place were strictly
opposed. Instead, DEELSA supported a shift away from wage replacement
benefits towards ‘in-work’ benefits but argued for a ‘slim’ version of such
policies to be financed primarily from ‘passive’ benefit savings within the same
client group rather than tax-based redistribution (OECD 1994c: 275–6).
The OECD-guided programme for welfare and labour market reform in its
member states covers the following policy dimensions: (1) the functional
integration of employment services with other benefit providing agencies in
order to create a ‘joint agency type’ that integrates job brokering and benefit
provisions (OECD 1997a: 6–7; 2000a); (2) the shift away from wage replace-
ment and benefit provisions for the unemployed in favour of ‘in-work’ benefits
and tax credits for low-paid workers (OECD 1995, 1997a); (3) the redesigning
of existing active labour market policies in member countries in order to
evaluate them more critically for effectiveness (OECD 1997b; 2000b: 133–
46); (4) the introduction of competition between national employment services
and private providers of job-brokering functions (OECD 2001b); (5) the
introduction of new institutional practices and techniques to supervise the
unemployed and other groups in the benefit system more effectively (OECD
2000a).
These different dimensions of welfare and labour market reform mutually
support each other. Small-scale ‘technical’ changes, as suggested by the OECD,
often initiate significant political changes within national labour market policies
at a later time. A good example is the OECD’s extensive fieldwork to compare
the interaction between OECD member states’ public employment services
and the unemployed with regard to the supervision of job-seeking behaviour
(as already referred to in section 5). The OECD selected the technique of
‘profiling’ (the process of making statistical predictions about the likelihood of
newly unemployed people to face the risk of long-term unemployment, as
used by the United States Employment Service) and studied the use of this
technique in the US setting.
In the next step, the OECD decided to promote ‘profiling’ as a policy idea
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and argued that its application in other OECD countries would be advisable,
and should also be combined with the introduction of new conditionality
regimes for clients’ access to benefits. Thus, the ‘profiling’ technique gained a
highly political meaning in the OECD discourse because employment services
had to adapt new screening regimes in their dealings with the unemployed.
Such changes, in turn, move institutional borderlines between unemployment
insurance, job-brokering functions and certain ALMPs; they also affect the
level of supervision of the behaviour of the unemployed in general. Thus, the
OECD provides a variety of options for policy-makers to choose from at any
given moment in the policy-making cycle.
In order to better explain the OECD’s function in policy-making, the next
section analyses four core features of the OECD’s organizational discourse.
These features are of broader theoretical interest because they are also present
to various degrees in other national and international organizations with a
long-term planning capability and involvement in agenda-setting efforts.
Four core features of the OECD’s organizational discourse
At the most basic level, the first core feature of the OECD’s discourse is the
invention and long-term maintenance of discursive validation procedures. This
includes the strategic choice about what should be considered a policy-making
problem and the construction of relevant knowledge with regard to this
problem. At a later stage, broader audiences are invited to share the results of
such preliminary agenda-setting deliberations. For example, the government
of Australia asked the OECD to study the outcome of its decision to open up
formerly public job-brokering services to private providers through a competi-
tive bidding system (OECD 2001b). The OECD used the opportunity of this
study to select a number of common themes and catchwords (such as
‘contestability’ in the case of privatized Australian job brokering), which were
then used in a variety of other policy-making contexts and started to ‘travel’
in the organization’s literature from one issue to the next. Such themes, once
established, are communicated and updated in regular OECD contacts with
national policy-makers and in OECD-guided reports, meetings and dissemina-
tion conferences.
A second core feature of the OECD’s discourse is the invention of new claims
to knowledge based on a particular interpretation of the authority of academic
economics. All OECD publications present policy recommendations as based
on the organization’s own scientific inquiry as well as the best available evidence
within the discipline of academic economics. However, how exactly these two
strands of expertise relate to each other is never made clear. The OECD tends
to refer to academic research in economics in a loose manner but this research
is not discussed in any detail. Rather, the research serves only to illustrate the
OECD’s political claims, and selective use of evidence takes the form of
assertions about significant correlations between variables in economic model-
ling – even if the evidence would not be judged as acceptable within academic
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economics.11 Furthermore, the vast majority of OECD reports and conference
proceedings are phrased in popular language and targeted at non-specialist
audiences. This is the case because the intended audiences – national policy-
making e´lites and special publics – demand easily adaptable discourses that
they can apply for their own purposes in a broad variety of settings. Thus,
OECD discourses aim to represent the scientific authority of the academic
discipline of economics; but all findings are put forward in a non-technical and
stylized manner that leaves them open to a broad variety of interpretations.12 In
other words, OECD policy advice always faces trade-offs between the provision
of detailed policy recommendations and the parallel demand of remaining
sufficiently general in scope in order to allow for application in a variety of
national contexts.
The third and fourth interrelated core features of the OECD’s discourse are
the networking or ‘coupling’ of different fields of policy-making and the parallel
development of a shared interpretative framework about the common underlying
features of various policy problems. For example, OECD benchmarking exercises
of national employment, education and health policies are all based on a
shared terminology, similar methods of inquiry, and adopt a unified style of
presentation. The OECD is thus in a position to suggest analytical indicators
in new fields of inquiry that are in turn based on the OECD’s own epistemic
claims about how the inquiry should take place, i.e. the ‘knowledge-creating
chain’ of expertise remains ‘in-house’ in many cases.
In summary, the OECD puts forward a homogeneous discourse in different
fields of policy-making because a neoclassical belief in market equilibrium
outcomes provides a unifying framework for all its activities. However, the
four outlined core features of organizational discourse (as opposed to the
particular policy-making beliefs of the OECD) exist to various degrees in all
national and supranational organizations that are engaged in knowledge
management as part of agenda-setting efforts. In the next section, this
relationship is discussed by comparing OECD and EU labour market and
employment discourses.
7. APPLYING THE ORGANIZATIONAL DISCOURSE PERSPECTIVE:
COMPARING OECD AND EU EMPLOYMENT DISCOURSES
A comparative evaluation of OECD and EU documents with regard to
employment between 1993 and 2003 demonstrates that close similarities exist
between both discourses. The OECD frequently acts as a first mover with
regard to the definition of policy problems, and these definitions are in many
cases accepted as given in subsequent EU deliberations. More specifically, the
ten demands put forward in the OECD Jobs Study and the ‘four pillars’ of
the EES from 1998 onwards – the latter recently relaunched and expanded –
share many core features (Casey 2002; CEC 2003). For instance, the first EES
pillar on ‘employability’ demands ‘real incentives for the unemployed to seek
and take up work’, which encourages EU member countries to restructure
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their benefit systems as a means of providing stricter conditionality regimes.
Furthermore, OECD and EU documents share a strong emphasis on the
reduction of taxes on labour in general and on non-wage labour costs in
particular. Both demand tax cuts in favour of small and medium-sized
enterprises.
This is consistent with the second EES pillar on entrepreneurship, supporting
temporary work contracts and wage flexibility for newly hired workers. The
third pillar on ‘adaptability’ (the EU’s favourite term to describe labour market
flexibility without using the term) highlights that the concept includes ‘the
organization of work, working patterns and contracts’, which is close to the
Jobs Study’s demand for flexible wage bargaining at the regional or plant level.
Only the fourth pillar on ‘equal opportunity’ in the labour market and the
closing of the employment gender gap is not addressed explicitly in the Jobs
Study. In summary, all the substantial demands of the Jobs Study with regard
to labour market flexibility have been included in the four pillars of the EES.
Although the two discourses show significant overlap, they also diverge in
other aspects. For example, in the second half of the 1990s the OECD
experienced rising demand by national governments for advice on ‘in-work
benefits’ to subsidize the income of low-wage workers. This issue had not
featured prominently in the Jobs Study because the OECD framed it in the
mid-1990s only as part of the broader tax-benefit system. From the OECD’s
earlier point of view, wage subsidies were a distortion of the ‘natural’ workings
of the labour market. However, the rising popularity of various ‘top-up’
payments in member states with highly liberal labour market regimes, such as
the US and Britain, resulted in the subsequent adaptation of the OECD’s
advisory work.
In the second half of the 1990s, the OECD began to put forward new
advice on ‘make work pay’ policies, which subsequently became prominent
OECD agenda items – especially because the need to finance such new policies
could act to justify parallel cuts in other areas of social security. The EU, on
the other hand, has been so far much more reluctant to use the EES to give
direct advice on in-work benefits because fiscal issues are much more sensitive
in the EU context, and the premium on broad policy frameworks rather than
detailed policy advice remains characteristic for the EES.
At present, most of the remaining differences between the OECD and the
EU with regard to welfare and labour market policies can be explained by the
EU’s lack of a single unified institutional discourse (as provided in the case of
the OECD by neoclassical economic beliefs). EU policy-making continues to
be based on compromise between various welfare and labour market regimes
in Europe and, for the time being, includes a commitment to maintain ‘social
partnership’ and ‘competitive corporatism’ in those member states in which
the institutional preconditions for such policies exist. As a result, EU delibera-
tions are based on interest group representation and pluralism rather than a
single and closed organizational discourse.
Thus, all four key features of the organizational discourse perspective as
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Table 1 Comparison of OECD and EU welfare and labour market discourses
OECD EU
Organizational discourse Neoclassical economic No single organizational
beliefs (market equilibrium discourse
outcome)
Dominant policy paradigms Conceptualization of Modernization paradigm
institutions as incentive based on ‘peer review’
regimes and ‘best practice’
Improvement of institutional dissemination
incentive regimes results in Consultation of social
improvement of outcomes partners and policy
Benchmarking: application learning
of neoclassical economic Benchmarking: creation
beliefs to all fields of policy- of new policy discourses
making
Comparative advantage in ‘First mover’ situation: Consensus building:
expertise selection of new policy adaptation of existing
problems and invention of discourses for EU
new policy solutions purposes
Triangulation of all policy Creation of new policy
fields according to venues and subsequent
macroeconomic claims institutionalization
Specific micro-level Creation of new policy
comparisons at the level of communities at the
the delivery of services expert level
Legitimacy based on the Legitimacy based on
academic discipline of consultation of interests
economics
Selected recent examples Labour market flexibility Gender mainstreaming
for welfare and concept ‘Life cycle approach’
employment policy ‘Make work pay’ Co-ordination of social
initiatives ‘Contestability’ of protection and
employment services employment policies
between private and public
providers
Source: Ideal-type comparison based on OECD documents (1994–2001) and EU
documents regarding the EES (1993–2003).
outlined above are less developed in the case of the EU as compared with the
OECD. In particular, the first two key features (long-term maintenance of
discursive validation procedures and invention of epistemic claims based on
the authority of academic economics) are much less important in EU policy-
making. This is due to the EU’s use of windows of opportunity to expand
into new areas of policy-making, which does not necessarily depend on the
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development of its own expertise before such expansion occurs. Moreover, the
absence of the institutional dominance of any single profession in EU bodies –
in comparison with the dominance of economists in the case of the OECD –
makes it more attractive to access existing knowledge from a broad variety of
sources once the demand for such expertise becomes apparent.
In the case of the EES, for example, the very openness of the EU policy
process demands a high degree of consensus and co-ordination in different
policy venues as a precondition for the development of any meaningful
discourse. Since EU policy expansion takes place in a multi-organizational
environment, it needs to be based on the involvement of existing stakeholders
in a given policy field in order to gain legitimacy. However, the openness of
EU policy deliberations does not grant any institutionalized veto powers to
the participants, which is in marked contrast to classical versions of neo-
corporatism based on tripartite co-ordination. In fact, EES documents fre-
quently refer to the primacy of economic policy objectives as outlined in the
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. Thus, many of the features of the EES
appear over-determined by other EU policy deliberations in the field of
economic policy-making – which are themselves not open for questioning –
in spite of the apparent openness of the process itself.
Moving on to the third and fourth core features of the organizational
discourse perspective (co-ordination between policy fields and subsequent
development of shared interpretative frameworks with regard to their common
underlying problems), it appears that they are applicable to both OECD
and EU employment discourses. The interpretative framework of the EES
contributes as much as the Jobs Study to the supply-side reform of welfare
and labour market policies but it is not based on an explicitly neoclassical
economic framework. Thus, the overall explanatory power of the organizational
discourse perspective remains much more limited in the case of EU policy-
making.
In fact, the case of the OECD is rather different in scope because the
organization focuses primarily on the early stages of the policy-making process,
leaving later stages to member states’ officials. The OECD’s personnel assumes
the position of ‘gate-keeper’ in preparing political issues for decision-making in
other venues at later times. The OECD’s premium is on controlling the ‘chain
of expertise’ – a discursive hierarchy that starts off with the power to define the
nature of policy-making problems and then involves the selection of relevant
knowledge and expertise in order to address the problem at hand.13 Later
on in the process, problem definitions are matched with solutions that are
subsequently disseminated in the OECD’s policy-making environment.
Although the organization has no direct control over the adaptation or rejection
of its proposals in other venues, it is usually able to maintain its dissemination
efforts over longer periods. This increases its chances of gaining influence at
some point. Moreover, the organization enjoys all the advantages of a ‘know-
ledge-managing’ institution that does not depend on the verification of its
epistemic claims by outsiders.
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In summary, the comparison of OECD and EU welfare and labour market
discourses underlines that both organizations share many assumptions, but
that their function in the agenda-setting process is rather different. In the case
of the OECD, the comparative institutional advantage is in ‘first mover’
situations; this includes the creation of new discourses and of detailed policy
proposals in the context of neoclassical economic beliefs. The EU frequently
adapts OECD discourses at a later stage and engages in subsequent consensus
building; but it does not base its deliberations on any single economic doctrine.
The EU’s open method of co-ordination, as adapted in the case of the EES,
works therefore in two directions: it aggregates member states’ experiences
with national labour market reform and it selects certain policy proposals that
represent emerging consensus. This article has argued that EU welfare and
labour market reform, as well as parallel debates about changes in the form
and function of public employment services, represent particularly clear cases
in which OECD agenda-setting efforts proved to be highly influential.
However, these cases should not be generalized and analysis of OECD influence
on agenda-setting must deal separately with each field of public policy.
8. CONCLUSION
The analysis of the OECD’s agenda-setting efforts with regard to welfare and
labour market reforms between 1994 and 2001 poses the question of whether
the OECD has been rather too successful in its ‘campaign on expertise’ for its
own long-term organizational success. Most of its lines of inquiry and many
of its political demands in the above-discussed cases have been ‘taken over’ by
policy-makers at the EU level. The subsequent work of the OECD in the field
slowed down considerably after 2001, which was evident in the decline in the
publication of new material. The EES, on the other hand, became a more
established site of policy-making.
For example, the Belgian EU Presidency in 2001 commissioned a new
group of academic advisers to develop a system of indicators to measure and
quantify the impact of future EU welfare and labour market policies – and
these are fields of knowledge which would otherwise classically fall to the
OECD. Such developments were not the continuation of earlier OECD
deliberations but were based on new departures. The extent to which such
policy initiatives have changed the fundamental logic of the EES as part of
the liberal reform agenda in the EU remains a matter of judgement. However,
it is safe to point out that the recent prominence of the ‘life-cycle approach’
in EU discourses – which derives originally from classical sociology – aims to
pursue an integrated reform agenda for welfare systems and the labour market
in a context which is not determined by neoclassical economic beliefs (Belgian
Presidency 2001; Esping-Andersen et al. 2002).
In fact, the policy-making environment has become much more crowded at
the level of international knowledge management and the ‘campaign on
expertise’ takes place in many policy venues at the same time. This makes it
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more difficult for the OECD to assume the position of opinion leader or
even to define its comparative advantage as opposed to other international
organizations. Many former comparative advantages, such as the unique
planning capability and the strong resource base, which were needed to sustain
long-term dissemination efforts for its own policy proposals, were eroded
during the later 1990s when member states decided to cut the organization’s
budget by around 18 per cent in real terms (OECD 2002: 9). Owing to the
shrinking resource base, the OECD as a political ‘portfolio organization’ must
aim to select only those policy fields for its own initiatives that promise to
offer the organization short-term legitimacy and broad public attention.
Moreover, the relative isolation of the OECD’s organizational discourse
from interest group representation might be useful in dealing with emerging
policy problems at the ‘ideational’ level before they become politicized.
However, these advantages for early agenda-setting efforts tend to become
disadvantages as soon as interest groups start to be involved. This, arguably,
limits the OECD’s room for manoeuvre to assume leadership positions in
newly emerging fields of policy-making in comparison to the Commission
(Greenwood 2003: 46–50). In short, policy-makers will choose the ‘right
venue for the right purpose’ and the OECD must prove that it adds value to
policy deliberations in a way that the Commission could not.
In conclusion, the question of how much organizational space is left for the
OECD in its competition with other international organizations can only
be answered in the light of the organization’s current and future policy
entrepreneurship. Observers of public policy would be well advised to give the
OECD more analytical attention in order to scrutinize how the organization
attempts to engineer ‘first mover’ agenda-setting situations that could shape
tomorrow’s policies – or indeed fail to do so. What can be said is that a
shrinking resource base puts additional pressure on the OECD to pick ‘winning
issues’ and to campaign only in cases that appear to have been previously
under-exploited by others.14 In such a campaigning and knowledge-managing
organization, expert personnel must be able and willing to switch fields and
must turn swiftly from one issue to the next in order to stay at the forefront
of public policy developments. Here, finally, one can find some poetic justice
in the fact that the supporters of the flexible labour market approach must
become more flexible themselves.
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NOTES
1 In September 2002, DEELSA experienced a reorganization and lost its education
section, which subsequently became an independent Directorate in its own right.
Since the article focuses on the time-frame before reorganization, the abbreviation
DEELSA is used throughout.
2 The connotation of the above terms is rather different depending on the policy-
making context in which they are applied. The term ‘activation’ is closest to earlier
notions of active labour market policy (ALMP) as used since the 1970s because it
focuses on large sections or all groups of the unemployed, while the term ‘workfare’
stands for a restrictive approach towards the group of long-term benefit recipients.
The origins of workfare can be traced to the Reagan administration’s Community
Work Experience Program (CWEP), passed by Congress in 1982, which allowed
US states for the first time to require welfare recipients to work in order to qualify
for benefits (Gottschalk 1998: 92). The idea featured prominently in subsequent
World Bank documents (1990). The OECD has occasionally used the term
‘workfare’ while EU discourses refer exclusively to ‘activation’.
3 For details, see the website of the European Employment Observatory at: http://
www.eu-employment-observatory.net/
4 Scho¨n and Rein (1994) describe the emergence of new ‘policy frames’ and their
subsequent acceptance by policy-makers as resulting in policy change. This article
argues that organizational discourse is a precondition for the development of such
policy frames, i.e. an early stage in the process of supplying them.
5 National ministries develop expert personnel to monitor the existing national
legislative and institutional heritage in order to receive advice on specific micro-
level changes and adaptations. International organizations, in contrast, are more
able to nurture ‘specific intellectuals’ for certain policy sectors. The first kind of
expert will tend to explain why change is difficult for reasons of national path-
dependency while the second kind of expert will argue that policy-learning from
‘best practice’ in other countries provides for better outcomes.
6 The ad hoc groups are ‘not ad hoc at all except in name’ (personal communication,
OECD official, November 2001). Some of these groups deal with the development
of statistical methods in order to improve the collection and comparability of data,
while others deal with regulatory questions. They often work horizontally with a
number of Directorates or are multi-year co-operative projects in their own right,
with loose ties to the OECD.
7 The OECD does not provide statistical data about the educational and professional
background of its personnel. A breakdown by nationality of the highest ‘A grade’
OECD rank shows that the United States and the United Kingdom with 133 and
90 ‘A grade’ members of staff make up the largest constituency after the French
(with 182) and before Canada, Germany, Japan and Italy with between 62 and 51
each (out of 858 on 15 May 2002, data provided by the OECD secretariat).
However, these figures do not adequately represent the dominance of Anglo-
American authors on the list of published OECD material throughout the 1990s.
8 A good example of the link between general and specific OECD discourses is the
recent policy fashion of ‘case management’ in OECD countries concerning both
health policy and employment policy. In both policy fields, individuals are
considered as ‘cases’ that merit certain quantitative resource allocations according
to specific average case costs (be it for hospital treatment or job placement efforts).
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The OECD holds that case management will improve institutional incentive
regimes, which are otherwise held to be based on ad hoc decision-making or rent-
seeking professional discretion.
9 For details, see the list of OECD publications on the topic throughout the 1990s.
10 More recently, the OECD has added ‘sustainability’ as the eleventh point to its
list of demands for labour market policy-making. This demonstrates that the
OECD accommodates new discourses that emerge from outside in cases in which
they complement existing OECD frameworks. The EU concept of ‘gender
mainstreaming’, on the other hand, has been excluded from the OECD discourse,
which demonstrates that the organization cannot see a comparative advantage for
own activism in this field.
11 The epistemic vagueness of the OECD’s position in its interaction with academic
economics helps the organization to remain on friendly terms with the profession.
In fact, the relationship works both ways and some academic economists exercise
strong influence on the OECD discourse owing to their role as consultants to the
organization. Layard, for example, questioned a number of core assumptions of
the Jobs Study regarding job protection legislation and the relationship between
taxation levels and employment outcomes (Layard 1999). However, he was
generally supportive of other OECD claims about the need to cut down the
duration and size of unemployment compensation in order to increase pressure on
the unemployed to accept any kind of available employment. The OECD published
Layard’s comments and turned down some of the Jobs Study’s earlier flexibility
claims in the second half of the 1990s. This was an agreement to partially disagree
for the sake of an additional authoritative ‘voice’ (cf. Fine 1998: 42–8).
12 For example, OECD publications on employment focus on representing policy
consensus rather than controversy. This is particularly evident in OECD conference
proceedings (cf. 2000b), which underline the OECD’s discursive power. National
policy-makers are invited to address OECD conferences and tend to use political
terminology that was previously invented within the OECD itself. Thus, such
conferences give the impression of a ‘consensus line-up’, i.e. the speakers are invited
to restate dominant OECD discourses rather than pose new questions.
13 A DEELSA official remarked that outside expertise was invited by the organization
to ‘scope’ work on newly emerging problems but that he personally ‘would rarely
allow consultants’ papers to go to countries without commentaries’ and that
additional papers would be produced to summarize key points as judged from the
OECD perspective (personal communication, February 2002). In effect, the
organization’s discourse is isolated from outside interests in a way that would not
be possible in the EU context.
14 The recent OECD ‘Programme for International Student Assessment’ (PISA) –
benchmarking member states’ education systems – has emerged as a major new
campaign issue of the OECD’s Directorate for Education, and many parallels to
the case of the Jobs Study can be observed.
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